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Preface    
This report is based on an investigation in India in April and May 1996 regarding the 
Rugmark Initiative -- a bold and controversial effort to develop a consumer label for 
hand-knotted carpets which were not made by child labor. Carpet makers in India, Nepal 
and Pakistan, three of the major exporters of hand-knotted traditional carpets, have 
recently been singled out by the western press for very deserving criticism for the large-
scale abuses of children involved in their production. As many as one million children are 
said to be "employed," which in too many cases means held in bonded servitude, making 
carpets for sale in western markets at the cost of their health, their education, their 
childhood and their future. Criticism from the west is, however, but the most recent 
voice. Indian human rights and children's advocates have long challenged the carpet 
industry for its abusive treatment of child laborers, and Indian law has in fact banned 
children from working in the carpet industry since 1938, when the Employment of 
Children Act was passed.    
Despite the law, abuses have persisted for decades, and even grown worse in recent years 
under increased export pressure. In the face of the failure of the Indian government to 
enforce its law, visionary Indian child labor activists created the Rugmark concept as a 
means by which positive international consumer actions could reward producers who 
employed adults and at the same time raise funds for the rehabilitation of former carpet 
children. Several years in gestation, with the on-again, off-again cooperation of the 
Indian Textile Ministry and the leadership of the carpet industry, and relying solidly on 
the support and encouragement of UNICEF-India and the Indo-German Export 
Promotion program (IGEP), the Rugmark program is now in its second year of full 
operation. As of June 30, 1996 some 250,000 carpets had been shipped to Germany by 92 
Indian exporters who were licensed to use the Rugmark label. Another 139 Indian 
exporters were applying for a license. In Nepal, an independent Rugmark Foundation has 
just been organized, but has already signed up factory owners responsible for producing 
70 percent of the country's carpet exports.    
This record of success, however, has been accompanied from the start by an unrelenting 
chorus of complaints from several quarters, which, if they persist, could undermine the 
effectiveness and credibility of the program. India's Rugmark Foundation, headquartered 
in New Delhi, is a new organization with no prototypes or precedents on which to base its 
operations. It is in every way a "work in progress," learning as it evolves and 
experimenting on a very large scale with complex economic, social and political forces. 
Many of these forces, sustained by deeply entrenched social attitudes and political 
alignments, are very resistant to change or challenge. It would be too much to expect this 
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newborn institution to achieve complete acceptance from this complex industry within a 
short period of time. Indeed, it has not. Some of the most influential carpet producers and 
exporters have been its staunchest critics. They have been joined by some child welfare 
advocates. It was to explore these complaints, to discover what reality, if any, was giving 
rise to them and to find out what, if anything, was being done to correct any real 
problems, that the International Labor Rights Fund undertook this investigation on behalf 
of the Child Labor Coalition in the United States. Our task was to separate out legitimate 
criticisms from those which were simply based on self-interest or misunderstanding and 
to assess what corrective steps were being taken and what are still needed, if any.    
A grant from the Reebok Human Rights Foundation made the investigation possible. We 
are grateful for their support but wish to absolve them from any responsibility for our 
findings. We are also grateful to the many persons in India -- government officials, 
UNICEF and UN Development Program officers, child welfare and human rights 
activists, Rugmark inspectors, carpet exporters and loom owners who assisted us with our 
mission, and we likewise excuse them from any responsibility for our conclusions. 
Furthermore, we were greatly aided by meeting in Germany with the Indo-German 
Export Promotion Council, the German Rugmark Bureau, the German Government's 
Development Agency (GTZ), and the German Protestant agency Bread for the World, 
which have all been instrumental in the establishment of the Rugmark program.    
ILRF director Pharis Harvey was joined on this visit by Robert F. Kennedy Memorial 
Center for Human Rights staff Abigail Abrash. We are grateful for this collaboration with 
the RFK Memorial, which in 1995 awarded its human rights award to Kailash Satyarthi, 
President of the South Asian Coalition on Child Servitude and a key promoter of the 
Rugmark concept.    
A brief note on spelling: In quotations, the spelling of Indian names and places has been 
kept faithful to the sources. Common words, such as "labour", have been uniformly 
changed to reflect American rather than British, or Indian, usage.  
Initials and acronyms used in the report  
 
AAFLI Asian American Free Labor Institute 
AICMA All India Carpet Manufacturers Association 
BBA Bachapan Bachao Andolan ("Save the Childhood Movement") 
CEPC Carpet Export Promotion Council (Indian Textile Ministry) 
CLC Child Labor Coalition (US) 
CMAWCL Carpet Manufacturers Association Without Child Labor 
CREDA Committee for Rural Education and Development Action 
GTZ German Development Agency 
IGEP Indo-German Export Promotion Program 
ILO International Labor Organization 
ILRF International Labor Rights Fund 
IPEC The ILO's International Program for the Elimination of Child Labor 
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NGO Non-governmental organization 
SACCS South Asian Coalition on Child Servitude 
SGS Securite Generale Surveillance, Inc. 
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund 
UP Uttar Pradesh State    
I. Introduction    
India's export of hand-knotted carpets grew significantly in recent years, from $65 
million in 1979 to $229 million in 1983, and then, following exposure of abusive child 
labor involved in their production, declined to $152 million in 1993, the latest year for 
which complete statistics are available. Today, floor coverings constitute India's third 
largest earner of foreign exchange and hand-knotted carpets constitute an important share 
of that market. The primary buyers are in the United States, Germany, Switzerland, 
Canada, Netherlands, Austria, England, Italy and other European countries. (See Table 1)  
   
Table I: Indian Hand-knotted Carpet Exports by Major Importing Country, 1993 
Australia-New Zealand $2,402,000
Austria $2,283,000
Belgium-Luxembourg $2,329,000
Canada $3,858,000
Germany $57,458,000
Italy $1,369,000
Netherlands $3,581,000
Switzerland $5,731,000
United Kingdom $1,085,000
U.S.A. $66,378,000
World Total $152,080,000
Source: United Nations, 1995  
However, this trade continues to depend unduly on massive and abusive use of children 
as weavers and knotters. The number of children in this industry also grew from an 
estimated 75,000 child workers in 1980 to 300,000 in 1994.i 
While children have historically worked the carpet looms of Kashmir and other regions 
of India, the majority until fairly recently were reportedly working for their own families 
as part of a traditional craft, their work a means of learning the family skills. Even today, 
much of the prevalent myth about child labor being a positive force in the education of 
children is rooted in this history of apprenticeship.    
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In modern times, however, carpet weaving came to be considered an unwholesome 
occupation for children. From the 1930s, restrictions were placed on the conditions in 
which children could legally work. As long as carpets were a small cottage industry 
producing for the domestic market, the numbers of children employed outside their own 
families was small. However, from about 1975, in response to the decision by the Shah of 
Iran to ban child labor from that country's carpet looms, Indian Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi determined greatly expand production and "replace" the Iranians from their 
preeminence in the export market. "Schools" were established in the carpet-producing 
areas, particularly eastern Uttar Pradesh State, under government auspices, which soon 
degenerated into government-run carpet factories, and the growing demand for export 
soon brought a need for increasing numbers of workers to produce the carpets. 
Recruitment of poor, lower caste and Harijan children from the neighboring areas of 
Bihar State and elsewhere began to fill the quotas of a growing industry. But this 
recruitment was often conducted under false pretense or coercion and led to abusive 
forms of bondage and slave labor in which small children were subjected to inhuman 
conditions and forced under threat of serious harm or starvation to work hundreds of 
miles away from their families. (Iran, incidentally, recovered its market share shortly 
after 1976 using adult labor, and continues to lead global hand-knotted carpet exports.)    
Beginning in the mid 1980s, European media exposure of these abuses led to calls for 
consumer boycotts, which, if carried out, would have devastated an important sector of 
India's economy. Sensing the potential for disaster if a boycott were successful, and the 
even worse disaster for children if child labor continued to grow as a factor of production, 
far-sighted children's advocates teamed up with some carpet industry leaders to try to 
stem the use of child labor by a positive marketing scheme whereby consumers could be 
assured they were not investing in the blood and toil of children.    
The initiative faced two problems. The first was how to use positive market incentives to 
bring about change in the carpet industry of India by eliminating child labor from the 
workforce, without at the same time causing the carpet industry to collapse or to lose 
significant market share or international competitiveness. The second was how to use the 
initiative to provide better options than slaving at carpet looms for the tens of thousands 
of child laborers who would be affected by a successful program. A scheme that 
eliminated child labor from this industry without bettering the conditions for the children 
themselves could hardly be declared a success.    
Balancing these two imperatives was the goal of the Rugmark initiative. This report 
examines its level of success to date, after eleven years of pregnancy and one year of 
infancy.  
RUGMARK INDIA: FACTS AND FIGURES  
1. Carpet Industry in India  
Status January 1996  
All figures approximate  
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Number of looms registered by the CEPC  
Number of carpet exporters  
Number of weavers  
90,000
2,700
1,500,000
Number of children in carpet production  
Official estimate  
Estimate of NGOs  
 
100,000 - 150,000
300,000
2. RUGMARK INDIA's Development and Progress 
Source: Rugmark Newsletter  
As of June 30, 1996  
Looms under RUGMARK  
Looms inspected by RUGMARK  
13,579 
7,535 
Carpet exporters with RUGMARK  
Licensees  
Applicants for a license  
231 
92 
139 
Looms with illegal child labor, detected by RUGMARK  
Total child labor found by RUGMARK, including permitted family based child 
labor  
408 
703 
Looms with licenses withdrawn 164
Number of carpets exported with RUGMARK label  250,486
 
II. History of the Rugmark Initiative    
The Rugmark initiative took a long time to move from dream to reality. In 1980, Kailash 
Satyarthi and other leaders of the Bonded Labor Liberation Front in New Delhi launched 
a crusade against bonded labor and child servitude in the carpet industry. The eastern end 
of Uttar Pradesh state, in a triangle from Varanasi to Mirzapur and Bhadohi, is the center 
of the carpet belt, where it was estimated that several hundred thousand children were at 
work, mostly under conditions of dismal servitude and bondage. (See map below) 
Despite the denials of government and industry about bonded child labor in the carpet 
belt, Satyarthi's crusade, aided by the Indian Supreme Court, caused the liberation of 
thousands of children who were discovered in raids by these activists. The activity also 
generated media attention in Europe, where conditions in the carpet industry of India and 
Nepal were exposed by independent TV producers for Granada Television in 1985.    
 6
Since conditions in India's carpet belt were similar to those found in a number of South 
Asian countries, Satyarthi worked to form a coalition of like-minded non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) in Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and India. This 
coalition, the South Asian Coalition on Child Servitude (SACCS) came into being in 
1989, and today numbers more than 250 organizations in the five countries. (See 
Appendix for list of affiliates in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar states of India.)    
When the 1985 Granada film on child labor in India was broadcast in London, Mr. Robin 
Garland, the newly elected chairman of E. Hill and Co., the largest British carpet 
importer at the time, was moved to come to India to investigate conditions. Through the 
Anti-Slavery Society Mr. Garland approached Kailash Satyarthi, and together they 
traveled throughout the carpet belt seeking ways for E. Hill to become pro-active for 
carpet children. A trust was established in London to run schools for carpet children in 
India, which became the "Project Mala." ("Mala" is Hindi for "garland.") A small project 
was set up, an architecturally advanced building, built with British design, was opened as 
a showpiece of educational excellence for about 50 children. In Indian terms it was 
hugely expensive and, according to Satyarthi, who declined the offer to become one of 
the leaders/trustees because of competing claims on his time, it resulted in producing 
children who were alienated from their own culture. In the name of "quality" it 
inadvertently created a small island of prosperity amidst a very large "sea" of need. 
Further, the perception gradually grew among activists that the "Mala" project was more 
useful for public relations than rehabilitation purposes. As a result, most of the original 
non-governmental sponsors of the "Mala" project pulled out, leaving only E. Hill and 
Obeetee, two large carpet exporters as the project's backers.    
Satyarthi's own efforts focused on liberating children from bonded servitude in carpet 
loom sheds by taking police on raids of loomsites. Over the course of ten years, 8,000 
children were liberated from the carpet industry out of over 30,000 children liberated 
altogethe by SACCS. A number of these liberated children were brought to New Delhi 
for three month rehabilitation and training at the Mukti Ashram, a residential school north 
of New Delhi. There the most active children were prepared for becoming activists in 
their own communities, the villages and towns in the poverty-stricken districts of 
southern and western Bihar state, which is considered the "catchment area" for recruiting 
carpet children.    
However, Satyarthi recognized that, no matter how many children were liberated one by 
one, others would take their place at the looms unless something could be done to create 
a disincentive to employ children in the industry as a whole. In 1990 a consumer 
awareness campaign was initiated in Germany with the help of trade unions, religious and 
human rights organizations and consumer groups. The campaign quickly spread to other 
European countries and the U.S. The impact was significant, causing carpet exports to 
drop considerably and creating panic among the producers and exporters. It also led to 
the formation of an important network of development and human rights organizations 
focused on child labor. These included: Bread for the World, Terre des Hommes and 
Miseriore, in Germany; the Child Labor Coalition, the Asian American Free Labor 
Institute, the National Consumers League and the International Labor Rights Fund in the 
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U.S.; Christian Aid and Anti-Slavery International in the U.K.; the India Committees of 
the Netherlands and Belgium; Radda Barnen and BLLF-Sweden; Asia Pacific Workers 
Solidarity Links, New Zealand, and the ICFTU and various international trade 
secretariats and labor centrals.    
Averting a Boycott. It was recognized by these organizations, however, that public 
exposés in the marketing countries could perhaps end or seriously lower the level of child 
servitude in the making of Indian carpets, but possibly at the cost of generating a 
consumer boycott that would seriously erode an important export industry and destroy the 
adult jobs needed to replace the children.    
The decline in exports brought about by the European publicity compelled some of the 
major producer groups, including the All India Carpet Manufacturers Association 
(AICMA) and the Carpet Export Promotion Council (CEPC), an instrument of the Indian 
Textile Ministry, to seek a dialogue with SACCS to settle the problem. A series of 
meetings followed in 1991, leading to a declaration AICMA in December 1991 that by 
March 1992 all children would be sent home and in their place adults would be employed 
with decent wages and facilities.    
This goal, impossible of realization on such a short time line, was recognized by a 
splinter group of manufacturers as a public relations gimmick to remove the spotlight of 
attention. In early 1992, about 50 manufacturers broke with the AICMA to form a 
separate association called the Carpet Manufacturers Association Without Child Labor 
(CMAWCL), pledging not to use child labor in their units. Most were smaller companies 
with only a tiny fraction of India's export markets. All were registered members of the 
CEPC, although not all were actively producing carpets at the time. And some were 
primarily making dhurries, woven scatter rugs, where child labor is less an issue than 
among hand-knotted carpets. Nevertheless, thanks to the devoted efforts of several of 
their representatives, including Mr. Gangadhar Dubey, they persisted in their crusade to 
bring change to the industry. Against hard lobbying and threats from larger producers, the 
CMAWCL argued that the "nimble fingers" of children were not essential to carpet 
production, and that adult wages would not significantly increase the cost of production. 
Little by little their numbers were augmented by larger producers. Today the CMAWCL 
has about 60 members.    
Crafting a Labeling System. SACCS' discussions with Bread for the World in Germany 
and other development agencies gave rise to the idea of creating a voluntary certification 
system to label carpets that had been made without child labor. In 1991 Satyarthi 
appeared before the United Nations Human Rights Commission subgroup on 
Contemporary forms of Slavery, to request a resolution calling for such a labeling 
system. That resolution, No. 1991/119 declared:    
(The UNHRC) recommends that products such as carpets whose manufacture is liable to 
involve child labor should bear a special mark guaranteeing that they have not been 
produced by children. In this context consumers should be alerted so that they will 
demand products bearing such a mark.    
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This recommendation was one of the most important encouraging signs for SACCS to 
strengthen its efforts to formulate an independent international agency comprising 
representatives of NGOs, carpet manufacturers, importers, exporters, international 
agencies such as UNICEF and consumer organizations, with the authority to certify the 
carpets made free of child labor and affix a label to that effect.    
The Harkin Incentive. This idea was given further stimulus by the introduction of 
legislation in the United States to ban the import of goods made by child labor. The 
Pease-Harkin bill, first introduced in 1990, by 1992 had generated enough concern in 
South Asia that the governments of India, Bangladesh and Pakistan began to take notice 
and develop strategies to protect their market share. It also caught the attention of 
Satyarthi, who criticized the Harkin bill as having an inadequate mechanism for 
determining when products from child-labor prone industries were not made with child 
labor. After Satyarthi met with Harkin in Washington, the senator amended his bill to 
allow for a genuinely independent labeling system to replace the self-monitoring by 
importers that had been the bill's device.    
Working Committee on Rugmark Initiative. Under these several stimuli, Indian 
governmental and industry groups gradually grew willing to form a working group with 
SACCS, UNICEF and others to explore the formation of a professional system for 
inspection and labeling consistent with international standards and requirements. Mr. 
Edward Oakley of OBEETEE Ltd. approached SACCS for a dialogue, admittedly out of 
fear of a market collapse if the Harkin bill succeeded. Jim Ehrmann, labor attache of the 
U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, was helpful in generating understanding about the Harkin 
bill and encouraging a positive response.    
The embassy also turned out to play a significant role at a pivotal moment, almost by 
accident. At about the time these conversations were just getting underway, the U.S. 
Embassy conducted its annual trade fair. Obeetee was a designated provider of carpets. 
However, when the embassy insisted on a pledge that no child labor had been involved in 
the production of the carpets, Obeetee balked. As a result, it was barred from the fair. 
Shocked, Obeetee's Oakley turned again to Satyarthi to organize a meeting.    
The Indo-German Chamber of Commerce was approached, as were the German 
Development Agency (GTZ) and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, a German foundation. One of 
the programs of the GTZ, the Indo-German Export Promotion Program (IGEP), 
expressed great interest in pushing the program forward, impelled by the desire of the 
German Commerce Minister to avoid a compulsory "social clause" in favor of 
voluntarism. The first joint meeting of representatives of union, ILO, industry, CEPC, 
embassies, NGOs, etc. was convened by SACCS near the beginning of 1992. At that 
meeting a working group was formed and IGEP took on the leadership of the program.    
The working group met frequently until late February 1994. Its membership included 
IGEP, several exporters including Obeetee, E. Hill & Co., and representatives from 
CMAWCL, plus NGOs represented by SACCS affiliates. By May, 1993, basic objectives 
and criteria for certification were established. The name RUGMARK had been chosen 
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for the initiative.ii  A goal was set of establishing the Rugmark Foundation in time to 
announce it at the January 1994 Domotex Trade Fair in Hamburg, Germany, the most 
influential carpet fair in the global rug market.    
In the May, 1993 statement of objectives, the foundation would be established as a non-
profit corporation to own the trade mark, consisting of representatives of:  
1. NGOs associated within the South Asian Coalition on Child Servitude;  
2. carpet manufacturers and exporters plus one representative of the CEPC;  
3. neutral international organizations (such as IGEP, ILO, UNICEF, etc.)    
The neutral international organizations were to name a chairperson who would be able to 
balance any conflicts of interests between the NGOs and the carpet industry 
representatives. The proposed non-profit corporation would carry out inspections and 
certification by its own corps of professional inspectors. Inspection results would be 
entered into a computerized database, with documentation "detailed enough that every 
eligible carpet can be traced back to the actual loom on which it has been produced."iii  
Additionally, it was determined that the NGOs of SACCS would be able to carry out their 
own inspections to examine independently loom owners' compliance with the 
certification criteria.    
During the summer and fall of 1993 the working group, under the leadership of IGEP, 
continued to formulate plans. By October, it appeared possible to complete the formation 
of the foundation in time for the next Hamburg carpet fair the following January 1994, 
and to use that occasion for a formal launching of a marketing campaign in Germany and 
elsewhere in Europe.    
However, the pace and fate of the Rugmark initiative, particularly the support and 
participation of industry representatives, were intrinsically intertwined with the fate of the 
Harkin bill in the U.S. Congress. During the fall of 1993, it became clear that Congress 
would not take up the Harkin bill for passage soon, due to relevant committee 
preoccupation with the debate over the North American Free Trade Agreement. As the 
Child Labor Deterrence Act's powers of persuasion began to fade, enthusiasm for 
Rugmark by the Indian government and important segments of the carpet industry began 
to lag. By early 1994, U.S. carpet importers were encouraging their suppliers to resist 
Rugmark, since they had become convinced that Harkin would not gain passage during 
the 103rd Congress.    
In India, resistance among producers and exporters grew, focusing on three themes, 
universality, professionalism, and diversity of NGO participation, which, since they have 
persisted as elements of criticism, need to be discussed at some length.    
Universality vs. Voluntarism. The first controversy was whether a labeling program 
should begin with those exporters and producers who were able and prepared to accept 
the conditions, even if they constituted a minority of the industry, or whether the program 
should be delayed until most of the 2,700 CEPC member exporting firms could be 
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included. The CEPC adopted the line that Rugmark should not be inaugurated until 
virtually all producers could participate. Since, as Obeetee's V.R. Sharma, Vice 
Chairperson of CEPC, pointed out to the working group, most companies lacked the 
"infrastructure" necessary to comply with the terms of the program, it should be delayed 
or redesigned. This argument was buttressed by descriptions of the industry which 
highlighted its diversity of production systems and widely scattered distribution of 
production units, mostly in small-scale loomsheds dispersed across some 100,000 square 
miles of rural landscape.   
This argument was most forcefully expressed in a position paper authored by Sharma and 
issued by the CEPC in July 1994. This paper described the four types of production in the 
carpet industry as follows:    
i) The manufacturer/exporter deals directly with the loom owners through his own 
employees spread out all over the carpet weaving areas anywhere in the country. He 
issues the raw material to the loom owners and receives the carpet from him. In this 
system there is direct contact between the loom owner and the manufacturer. His staff 
can make periodical visits to the loom owner's establishment but again because of the 
huge area of weaving these visits, for practical reasons, cannot be more than once or 
twice a month. This system is applicable only to a small section of the total carpet 
production.    
ii) The second system is where the manufacturer/exporter gives his raw material, design 
and order specifications to a completely independent entrepreneur who finds loom 
owners (in number normally ranging from 5 to 100) and receives the woven unfinished 
carpets which he thereafter gives to the manufacturer/exporter either in finished or 
unfinished condition. For this he receives a monitory (sic) consideration. In this system 
the manufacturer/exporter does not have any idea as to where carpets against his orders 
are being woven. His only contact is the small entrepreneur who has arranged the 
weaving of his carpets.    
iii) In a third system the manufacturer/exporter gives to the small entrepreneur only the 
design and colors for the carpets to be made against his order specifications. The 
entrepreneur then purchases the raw material, arranges its dyeing and gets the carpet 
woven as in (ii) above. These carpets are then sold to the manufacturer/exporter either 
finished or unfinished. Here again there is no contact between the exporter and the loom 
owner nor is the exporter aware as to where these carpets are being made.    
iv) In yet another system individual loom owners themselves, or small entrepreneurs 
manufacture their own carpets and sell them to the manufacturer/exporter. In none of 
these systems is there any contact between the exporter and the real manufacturer, the 
loom owner.iv 
The CEPC noted that child labor is employed "mainly in the weaving of carpets and here 
too different age groups, doing different work, further compound the problem of 
quantifying the use of children. Moreover, the issues of age, status of child worker, 
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whether family based or hired complicate the records and surveys or census." Their 
conclusion:    
Honest and credible certification of carpets made without child labor must include a 
system where the origin of the carpet being exported can be traced back to day one when 
the weaving of the carpet began and the monitoring of that loom should have been done 
during the entire weaving process.v 
CEPC concluded that such monitoring of the entire industry was not possible because of 
the variations in the level of engagement in production by exporters and because of the 
size of the geographical area which would have to be monitored. On this basis, they came 
to reject a child-free production label.    
Countering this perception and orientation was the belief, shared by others in the working 
group, that a voluntary program begun by those producers and exporters ready and able 
to meet the demands of the certification system was possible and preferable. Recognizing 
that a large segment of the industry would be unlikely to qualify due to the lack of 
controls that exporters had over the terms under which their carpets were made, they 
nevertheless argued that a voluntary program begun only by those exporters who were 
able to oversee the terms of their loomowners' labor practices was preferable to no 
program at all, and was probably also the only way in which a labeling program could 
ever get off the ground. They saw the demand for near universal participation as a 
subterfuge for delay.    
Internal vs. External Monitoring. Another element of controversy was introduced by 
the demand from CEPC for Rugmark to contract out the inspection system to an 
international quality control firm rather than undertake to train and oversee inspectors 
internally.    
The May 27, 1993 declaration of principles had called for a plan of inspection and 
compliance monitoring that was self-contained. The Rugmark Foundation would carry 
out inspections and certification by its own corps of professional inspectors, trained and 
supervised by itself. However, during the fall of 1993, the idea was planted to turn to 
existing quality control inspection firms, such as Securite Generale Surveillance (SGS), a 
Swiss company with offices in India, for advice, and perhaps for inspection services. The 
idea was never formally discussed or accepted by the working group due to the 
suspension of its work in March 1994 and the subsequent resignation from the working 
group of CEPC and Obeetee officials. However, shortly after the March, 1994 suspension 
of the committee, contact was made with SGS by Mr. V. R. Sharma of Obeetee and an 
official of IGEP. Sharma accompanied two SGS staff around the carpet belt, 
demonstrating the hardships of carrying out inspections. According to one report, Sharma 
described vividly to the two SGS men how violent and dangerous the region was toward 
inspectors, how his own carpet people were being beaten up for asking about child labor. 
As a result of their examination of field conditions in the industry, they determined that 
the "modus operandi" of the carpet industry made such inspections inappropriate for a 
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company like SGS, whose expertise lay in factory inspections for quality of merchandise. 
   
It appeared to the NGOs on the committee that the introduction of SGS and its reported 
recalcitrance to take up an inspection regime were being to be used as an excuse to stall, 
on the part of some of the corporate participants. Both Shamshad Khan and Kailash 
Satyarthi complained to the committee that no NGOs on the committee had been 
involved in any discussion with SGS, or in any orientation or exploratory visits to the 
carpet belt.    
SGS's refusal to consider contracting to inspect for child labor has, in fact, been seized by 
the critics of Rugmark as proof of the impossibility of any inspection system. Dan 
Hodges, president of the Oriental Rug Importers Association of the U.S. testified in June, 
1995 as follows:    
"When the Rugmark Foundation last year approached the Indian office of Societe 
Generale de Surveillance, or SGS, the renowned Swiss-based quality assurance company, 
to conduct loom inspections on its behalf, the SGS response was unequivocal: monitoring 
of carpet looms was "not feasible." Rugmark officials now claim to be training a limited 
number of their own inspectors, but it is most unclear how these non-professional recruits 
can adequately monitor so many looms over such a vast territory when the top inspection 
company in the world deems it impossible.”vi 
What this interpretation fails to note is that SGS only indicated that, for itself as a profit-
making quality control corporation, the modus operandi of the carpet industry was such 
that establishing a monitoring system was "not feasible." The SGS decision was not a 
generic indication of the impossibility of monitoring through some other structure.  
NGO Representation. The third challenge raised by CEPC and some industry 
representatives to the working group was whether the NGOs on the committee were 
sufficiently representative. Claiming that SACCS was but one NGO, these 
representatives sought to have other groups join the working committee.    
SACCS, however, was not a single NGO, but an association of children's rights 
organizations throughout South Asia, with at least 123 affiliated organizations in the 
Indian carpet belt itself. (See Appendix I for a list of SACCS affiliates in the carpet belt) 
The desire for a "broader" representation appeared designed more to limit the influence of 
SACCS' president, Kailash Satyarthi, whose widely publicized raids on carpet loomsheds 
to liberate children from conditions of horrible bondage had created the awareness in 
Europe of the problem of child labor in the first place. NGOs in India are sharply divided 
on questions of trade policy, i.e. whether trade sanctions or pressures should be used to 
exert influence on government policy regarding child labor. Many NGOs relying on 
government funding to conduct programs for working children have been hesitant to 
challenge government policies sharply. Others believe genuinely that such economic 
pressures are simply stratagems designed in foreign countries to put India at a 
competitive disadvantage. Whatever the reasons, the divisions within the NGO world are 
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real, and CEPC certainly desired to take advantage of these divisions by diluting the 
strong voice of the SACCS representatives in the working group.    
In February, 1994, as the pressure lessened due to the Harkin bill's declining prospects 
for passage, publicity in Europe about the Rugmark initiative began to generate 
expectations of a carpet label imminently available for consumers. The tensions 
engendered by these contradictory developments flared to the surface in an ultimatum 
issued to the committee by Mr. Sharma of Obeetee:    
1. Obeetee would remain in Rugmark if it remains a voluntary certification and 
labeling scheme with "unquestionable standards of integrity and credibility."  
2. Rugmark should not be propagated in the media until it is complete.  
3. Rugmark should not be incorporated until every detail of its operation has been 
finalized.  
4. The NGO representation should be broadened to include non-SACCS-affiliated 
groups.  
5. Since few exporters have the "infrastructure" necessary to comply with 
certification standards, the work of the Foundation should be initiated only after 
the great majority of firms can comply.  
6. If these demands were not met, Obeetee, E. Hill and Bholanath Carpets would 
disassociate from Rugmark.vii 
Concurrent with these demands was a carpet industry campaign of criticism against the 
Indo-German Export Promotion Program for exercising what some considered undue 
foreign influence. IGEP responded by suddenly withdrawing from leadership of the 
Rugmark working group. On March 4, 1994, Dr. Dietrich Kebschull sent a sharply 
worded memo to the working committee members suspending IGEP's services for the 
Rugmark initiative, "unless we receive concrete and practicable proposals, particularly by 
the representatives of the carpet industry in the Rugmark Working Committee, for the 
further concretization and implementation of the proposed inspection / monitoring 
system..."    
Rugmark was in danger of collapse. The ultimatum of Obeetee and the response by IGEP 
threatened to result in a stalemate. However, other exporters and the NGO representatives 
insisted that the working group continue to develop the program. Without the 
participation of CEPC or Obeetee, E. Hill and Bholanath Carpets, but with the ongoing 
efforts of the NGOs, CMAWCL and UNICEF, and the renewed involvement of IGEP, 
the work went on. By mid-summer, 1994, the design of the Rugmark monitoring system 
had been completed and an application for foundation status filed with the Indian 
government. It followed closely the guidelines established in May, 1993.    
That application was granted on September 5, 1994. The initial members of the board of 
directors were Dr. Dietrich Kebschull of IGEP, Chairman; Dr. Richard Young, Director 
of Community Development Programs of UNICEF-India, Vice-Chairman; G. D. Dubey 
and Ram Chandra Maurya, carpet exporters related to CMAWCL; Kailash Satyarthi of 
the Bachapan Bachao Andolan (BBA - "Save the Childhood Movement",) and Shamshad 
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Khan of CREDA, both members of SACCS. A few months later, these members chose 
Mrs. Maneka Gandhi, widow of former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's son Sanjay and a 
former Minister of the Environment (and, since May, 1996, a Member of Parliament,) as 
the new chairperson.    
The staff hired initially was inexperienced and, although they made strong efforts to 
establish a comprehensive program of monitoring and inspection, the obstacles faced by 
the Foundation were formidable. This allowed for a campaign of criticism to be generated 
without adequate response. However, with the hiring of a new director of the inspectorate 
in July, 1995, and a senior executive director, Maj. General Satish Sondhi (Retd.), in late 
1995, these problems began to be overcome. A retired infantry commander with a no-
nonsense reputation and strong organizational skills, Gen. Sondhi has overseen the 
employment and training of a body of field inspectors and other staff that now include 21 
persons, eight in the New Delhi office handling applications, contracts, labels and 
finances, and 13 members of the inspectorate based in the carpet belt in Varanasi. The 
inspectorate staff is headed by Matthew John, a university researcher from Kerala long 
resident in Varanasi.    
The Rugmark label was not formally registered as a trademark until December 20, 1995 
when its registration was received in the German Patent Office. In April, 1996, 
registration was completed in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office These steps 
formalized the international use of the logo and name Rugmark in Switzerland, India, 
Germany, Nepal, the U.S., and other major marketing countries, and render it illegal for 
anyone to use the name Rugmark to label a product that has not been produced under the 
supervision of the Rugmark Foundation. In India and Nepal, Rugmark has adopted a tri-
fold process for determining whether carpets were made without illegal child labor -- 
license approval, random follow-up inspections, and carpet tracking. In addition, the 
program has begun a parallel track for helping children found in the course of the 
inspections to be working at carpet looms.    
The first applications for licenses by exporters were accepted in December, 1994, and the 
first carpets received their labels in March, 1995. By July, 1996, more than 260,000 
carpets had been individually labeled and exported, primarily to Germany. The Rugmark 
program, despite its rough and rocky birthing, has gotten underway.    
For the first year of operation, GTZ provided an advance, which together with license 
fees and other subscription fees enabled the foundation to begin its work. However, from 
April 1, 1996, Rugmark India became self-sufficient, its operations financed entirely by a 
charge of 0.25% of the F.O.B. value of carpets bearing the Rugmark label. Rehabilitation 
programs for children were to be financed by a voluntary contribution of 1% of the 
importers costs in Germany. As the program has grown, these fees may become 
contractual and obligatory in Germany. A third aspect of the program, not foreseen in the 
original design, is promotion and trademark protection in the marketing countries. In 
Germany, these functions were established in 1996 by a grant from the German 
government. In the United States, the Rugmark Foundation U.S.A. was formed in July 
1996 for similar purposes.  
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In December 1995, Rugmark Nepal was also formally established as a non-profit 
organization with a board made up of carpet manufacturers and Nepalese non-
governmental organizations. Since Nepalese law forbids non Nepalese citizens from 
being board members of locally chartered organizations, the international organizations 
that aid and support the program, UNICEF-Nepal, AAFLI, and GTZ, formed an advisory 
committee to work closely with the board of directors in monitoring the compliance 
system. From the outset, close to 70% of the carpet production in Nepal was represented 
by licensee applicants. Because of the geographical concentration of carpet factories in 
the Kathmandu valley, inspection and monitoring are considerably easier than in India. 
Also, because of the structure of the industry, comprised mostly of large factories with 
hundreds or thousands of workers, checking for child labor is made considerably easier 
than in India. Nepal Rugmark planners also were able to learn from the early problems of 
Rugmark India in planning for rehabilitation and schooling for children as a central 
element of the plan from the beginning. Schools for former carpet children were started 
long before the Rugmark program was in place, so that the dislocation of children from 
the factories was kept to a minimum. The program is very young but promising, due to 
the leadership being exerted by a number of socially progressive factory owners and their 
foreign partners.    
The expansion of the Rugmark program from its Indian base to include several producing 
and marketing counties has necessitated the formation of an international structure to 
provide coordination and set standards for practices in each of the several national bodies. 
As this report goes to press, the international structure is under discussion among the 
various national Rugmark foundations.    
III. Processes and Procedures    
In India and Nepal, Rugmark has adopted a tri-fold process for determining whether 
carpets were made without illegal child labor -- licence approval, random follow-up 
inspections, and carpet tracking. In addition, the program in India has begun recently a 
parallel track for helping children found in the course of the inspections to be working at 
carpet looms. This program is described in Chapter IV.    
In terms of the CEPC's description of the Indian carpet industry cited above (p. 9-10), it 
is clear that the Rugmark program was designed only for those firms in the first and 
fourth categories, i.e. exporters who contract directly with loomowners and maintain 
contact and control throughout the production process, and loomowners who 
independently make and sell their own carpets to exporter or foreign importers. The 
Rugmark system cannot work for those exporters who simply farm out production of 
carpets through brokers.    
The Rugmark Criteria. Immediately upon formal establishment of the Rugmark 
Foundation in India, two documents were distributed widely to prospective licensees -- 
the "Rugmark Criteria" and "Inspection Modalities." These two documents, which were 
incorporated into each license agreement, stipulated the mandatory criteria for 
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participating and the elements of inspection that licensees were required to facilitate at all 
loom sites.    
The criteria included five elements that must be demonstrated to the Foundation's 
satisfaction.  
1. Applicants must be bona fide dealers, manufacturers or exporters of carpets.  
2. Applicants must demonstrate commitment to the complete removal of child labor 
in their entire carpet production effective from date of application.  
3. A full list of sources must be submitted to Rugmark and updated every six 
months.  
4. All looms/loom units on which the applicant's carpets are being made must be 
duly registered with the CEPC.  
5. All carpets submitted for inspection must have been manufactured without the 
involvement of children under 14 years of age. (Note: this restriction does "not 
affect the loom owner's facility to make use of family child labor provided the 
applicant obtains an undertaking from the source that all such family children 
under 14 years of age attend school regularly."    
In addition, prospective licensees must sign a declaration "unequivocally committing 
(themselves) to the payment of at least the official minimum wages to the loom-owners" 
and to secure from the loom-owners a sworn affidavit that no child labor is employed and 
that weavers are paid at least the official minimum wages.    
Modalities of Inspection. The modalities of inspection laid down the information and 
access which the exporter agrees to provide at every loom site.    
At the loom sites:  
1. Inspections are to be carried out by professional inspectors of Rugmark 
Foundation, augmented by random checks by NGOs associated in SACCS.  
2. Inspections will gather the name of the loomowner, location of loom unit, 
evidence of registration of the loom unit with the CEPC, the number of looms, the 
names, age and sex of the person(s) working in the loom unit. In the case of 
working children, the number, name(s), places of origin and category of work. In 
the case of family child labor, evidence of school attendance. Names of the agents 
or enterprises to whom the carpets are supplied, and the weaving charges per 
square meter/yard received by the loom owner for his carpets.  
3. Every loom is to be individually marked by a number plate (with the RUGMARK 
code number for the respective unit and loom.    
During inspection of the exporters, the following details are to be assessed;  
1. The sources of the carpet(s) with the RUGMARK code number for each carpet;  
2. the packing lists with the RUGMARK serial number for each individual carpet;  
3. weaving charges paid per square meter/yard of carpet by the exporter;  
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4. the importer of the shipment, if identifiable;  
5. Assurance that there is no mixing of carpets from certified and other sources; and  
6. That there is no multiple use of serial numbers or unauthorized labeling.  
The findings of inspections at the loom sites and the exporters' facilities are entered into a 
computerized database, which is constantly updated and checked for duplications or other 
anomalies.    
Finally, the modalities document specifies that "The documentation of the inspection 
findings must be elaborate enough to facilitate every eligible carpet to be traced back to 
the actual loom unit in which it has been produced."    
License Approval. Exporters willing and able to meet the terms of the Rugmark Criteria 
and the Inspection Modalities are required to take the following steps and file affidavits 
with confirming information together with their license application:    
1. Register all looms making carpets for the company with the Carpet Export 
Promotion Council.  
2. Provide a complete list of looms, including owners, description and location and 
loom registration numbers, to the Rugmark Foundation.  
3. Provide complete export data for the past two years to the Rugmark Foundation.    
If the loom list is complete and sufficient to account for the export quantities for the past 
two years, Rugmark inspectors make random surprise visits to 35 percent of the 
exporter's loom sites. If no child labor is discovered to be in infringement of these 
criteria, the exporter is approved to become a licensee. If child labor is found, the loom 
owner is given a short period to replace them with adults. A second surprise inspection is 
then made within a few weeks. If children are found again, the license application is 
rejected. During inspections is it assumed that an empty seat at an active loom is vacated 
by a child, unless it can be demonstrated otherwise.    
The License Agreement. The License Agreement legally binds both parties to the 
following terms:    
1. "The licensor (Rugmark Foundation) grants to the Licensee the non-assignable 
right to use the Rugmark Logo upon and/or in relation to the Contract Products 
manufactured by or for the Licensee for sale in India and in other countries . . . ."  
2. "The Rugmark Logo shall be used by the Licensee only upon and /or in relation to 
the contract Products manufactured by or for the Licensee in accordance with and 
after due fulfilment of the mandatory RUGMARK CRITERIA, INSPECTION 
MODALITIES and specifications laid down in this behalf by the Licensor and 
shall not be used upon or in relation to any goods other than the Contract Products 
so manufactured."  
3. "The manner in which the Rugmark Logo may be used by the Licensee upon and / 
or in relation to the Contract Products and on labels, packaging, printed or other 
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material or wheresoever, for sale in India and the other territories ... shall be 
approved in writing by the Licensor prior to any such use. . "  
4. The Licensee shall at all times, during the continuance of this Agreement, permit 
the Licensor or any representative/s duly authorized by the licensor to enter any 
part or parts of any factory or premises where manufacture of the Contract 
Products is carried or where the Contract Products are stored by or for the 
Licensee for the purpose of Inspecting the Contract Products and/or the 
manufacturing thereof and/or of checking upon compliance by the licensee of the 
terms of this agreement and/or due fulfilment of the mandatory Certification 
Criteria, Inspection Modalities and specifications laid down in this behalf by the 
Licensor.  
5. "The Licensee shall be non-exclusive user of the Rugmark Logo in India and the 
other territories . . ."  
6. ". . .the Licensee agrees to pay to the Licensor a fee . . . equivalent to 0.25% of 
F.O.B. value of the exported Contract Products. The licence fee ... shall cover, 
besides other expenses, cost-free issue of Rugmark labels."  
7. "The Licensee recognizes and acknowledges the title of the Licensor to the 
Rugmark Logo ... and shall not use the Rugmark Logo as a part of its corporate 
name or trading style or register or seek to register . . . the Rugmark Logo or any 
trade mark similar thereto, in respect of any class of goods, whether in India or in 
any other country."  
8. "The Licensee undertakes to bring to the notice of the Licensor all cases of 
infringement and/or passing off of the Rugmark Logo or registration or attempted 
registration of the Rugmark Logo or any trade mark similar thereto. . . . If the 
Licensee or any of its customers is sued for alleged infringement of the Rugmark 
Logo, the Licensee, on service upon it of any notice of any such claim, shall 
forthwith give the Licensor written notice thereof and of all particulars thereof 
and the Licensor shall have the right to participate in the defense of such suit by 
its own counsel and at its own expense."  
9. "This Agreement shall come into force from the date of execution and shall 
continue to remain in force unless terminated by either of the partners in terms of 
Clause 10 hereof. 
10. "a).This Agreement shall stand terminated forthwith if the Licensee goes into 
liquidation/dissolution . . . has receiver of its assets appointed, makes composition 
with creditors, ceases to carry on business or ceases to use the Rugmark Logo 
commercially for a consecutive period of twelve months or merges or 
amalgamates with another company/firm or there shall occur, in the opinion of the 
Licensor, a substantial change in the management of control of the Licensee."  
"b). This agreement may be terminated by the Licensor forthwith if the Licensee 
shall happen to be in breach of any of the terms hereof and/or the mandatory 
Certification Criteria, Inspection modalities and specifications laid down in this 
behalf by the Licensor and shall have failed to rectify such breach within thirty 
days of a notice in this behalf having been served on the Licensee. 
"c) This agreement may be terminated by the Licensee if the Licensor shall 
happen to be unable to fulfill the criteria and modalities of this Agreement.  
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(d) . . . this agreement may be terminated by either party upon giving ninety days' 
notice in writing to the other, without assigning any reason whatsoever.    
In addition, the License agreement specifies that it shall be governed by Indian law and 
that any dispute between the parties shall be settled by arbitration under the auspices of 
the Indo-German Chamber of Commerce.    
Random Inspections. Once an exporter/producer has been licensed, labels are not 
automatically available for all his carpets. Rather, a second process ensues to get labels 
for carpets individually when they are ready for export. This includes the following steps.  
1. When the exporter receives a purchase order for carpets, a copy of the purchase 
order is submitted to the Rugmark Foundation together with the information about 
the carpet's production, including size, basic design, quality, color and, most 
important, the location and CEPC registration number of the loom where the 
carpet will be produced.  
2. This information is entered in the Rugmark computer in New Delhi and sent to 
the inspectorate office nearest the looms where the carpets wills be made. Each 
carpet is given an identification number at this stage.  
3. During the production of the carpet, which can take from one month to nine 
months, depending on various factors, the Rugmark inspectors have the 
opportunity to make surprise visits, to see not only if there are children working 
but to check the specifications of the carpet on the purchase order with the carpet 
actually being made.  
4. If child labor is found working on the carpet, or elsewhere in the same loom shed, 
the loom owner is warned and a second surprise visit is made within a few weeks. 
If children are found again, the loom owner is decertified as a Rugmark producer. 
No further carpets for this or any other exporter can be accepted for a Rugmark 
label.    
As of the end of June 1996, 164 looms had been decertified, 703 children, including 
family members, had been found at 408 looms, most of which subsequently passed 
inspection. More than half these children were discovered in the early months of the 
program.    
A second set of checks and balances guards against false or inadequate inspections:  
A. Inspectors work in pairs, which change daily.  
B. Inspectors are unaware of the locations of their inspection sites until the morning of 
the inspection, when they receive their orders from New Delhi.  
C. Inspectors are paid significantly more than they might make at other jobs in the region, 
which creates a disincentive to risk a good job for some side payments.  
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D. The supervisor of the inspectorate is from a distant region of India and has no 
religious, caste, personal or familial ties in the area that might upset his objectivity.  
In the only instance so far of misbehavior by inspectors, one inspector was let go early on 
in the program because it had been his belief that the goal was to identify as many 
children as possible, and he had falsified records to show more underaged workers than 
they had actually discovered.  
Carpet Tracking. Finally, if no child labor has been found during production, when the 
carpet is ready for shipment overseas the exporter informs the Rugmark Foundation, 
which provides the numbered label to the exporter. Each label bears a unique number, 
assigned by the Rugmark Foundation and printed by computer on the label, which 
identifies the maker, location and exporter.    
The value of this additional effort is to make it considerable more risky, if not impossible, 
for an exporter to register some looms but to contract out to other loomowners for the 
actual manufacture of carpets in a bid to save costs through using loomowners with child 
labor. The actual savings that might be obtained, estimated by Rugmark to be within 3 
percent of the exporters' costs, are hardly worth the effort at subterfuge when weighed 
against the risk of discovery and loss of license This extra level of control also lowers any 
incentive for independent loom owners to try to sell finished carpets to Rugmark 
exporters in the hope of cashing in on the Rugmark name without involvement in the 
program.    
This process also makes it possible to track carpets in the importing countries for possible 
counterfeits. The Rugmark Foundations in the U.S., Germany and other marketing 
countries will also have the computerized data on each carpet, making it possible for 
dealers or consumers to check on the authenticity of a carpet with the Rugmark label.    
Rehabilitation of Child Workers. What about the children located during this 
inspection process? The formal process adopted by the Rugmark Foundation was for the 
inspectors to notify only the New Delhi office of Rugmark when children were found, 
giving the names and family data for each child. Then the New Delhi office would notify 
NGOs, also headquartered in New Delhi, who would inform their field offices or 
affiliates in the locality where the children were found. These NGOs would then attend to 
the needs of the children.    
An important concern early in the program was whether loomowners would claim all the 
children at their looms were family members. To be sure, such claims were made, and 
even in some villages school officials were bribed to issue fake school certificates for 
these children. But Rugmark inspectors soon developed other means to confirm or 
challenge these claims. Children interviewed who were not in school could not read or 
write, did not know a teacher's name, or had no books or supplies to show the inspectors. 
Also non-related children seldom were dressed or fed as well as the owner's real children. 
So, by the time we visited, the Rugmark inspectors expressed complete confidence in 
their ability to unmask false claims of family ties to loomowners.  
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The number of children identified in this way was relatively small, and primarily in the 
first few months of the program, before many loomowners came to recognize the need to 
actually comply. (See table for numbers, p. 5) Further, the numbers of children found 
who were not local residents but hired or acquired from outside the local village, i.e. 
bonded child labor, was even smaller among those loomowners who were part of the 
program.    
However, this process proved to be too slow to identify and assist the small number of 
children who were found to be in actual need, for by the time the information had made 
full circle from the carpet belt to Delhi and back, in most cases the children had been 
dismissed and could not be located.    
Learning from this experience, the planners of the Rugmark program in Nepal began with 
a demand for carpet manufacturers to phase out children from their production facilities 
only at the pace it was possible to place the children in schools or other facilities for their 
care, or to return them to their families. While the industry in Nepal is highly 
concentrated in the valley of Kathmandu, which makes monitoring of such steps easier, it 
provided an important refinement of the Rugmark process that can be adapted in other 
countries.    
During the period of our investigation, Rugmark officials in India were designing a new 
procedure, which would include a second wing of the Foundation's work in the carpet 
belt, with personnel trained in care for children, education, rehabilitation, etc. When 
children in trouble are located, the inspectors now turn this information over directly to 
the Foundation's field staff responsible for child welfare, who take up the matter of 
locating families, contacting police or other officials and bringing the children out of their 
bondage. One school has snow been opened in Varanasi for these children. A residential 
facility, patterned after the Mukti Ashram run by SACCS in New Delhi, is being built as 
the first line care facility for children located at Rugmark licensees' (or applicants') 
looms. In addition, SACCS-related NGOs provide their own independent monitoring and 
surveillance of carpet looms throughout the carpet belt, and conduct a wide variety of 
services and programs for carpet chilren. A fuller description of these rehabilitation 
programs is found in Chapter V.    
If the numbers of children found directly by Rugmark inspectors continues to decline, the 
immediate care facilities may be needed only for a transitional time. In that case, the 
Rugmark Foundation can turn its rehabilitation work into social investment in the poor 
communities that have served as the catchment areas for the carpet industry.    
IV. Challenges and Responses    
The conflict between CEPC and the other members of the working group in 1994 would 
hardly have been worth describing in this report, apart from the fact that the criticisms 
and charges levied then have continued to echo from some industry and Indian 
government sources as well as some non-related Indian NGOs, and that some firms have 
subsequently used their political leverage to get the CEPC to inaugurate its own official 
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labeling scheme called KALEEN. (As far as could be determined during our visit and 
since, Kaleen has not yet begun functioning.) The fact that these criticisms were still 
circulating in 1996 prompted our investigation.    
To summarize, the substantive criticisms that have been leveled at Rugmark can be 
classified under five headings:    
1. Difficulties related to the structure and widely scattered rural location of the 
carpet industry. The geographical nature of India's carpet industry, with loomsheds with 
from one to 20 looms scattered in villages across a 100,000 square mile area, involving a 
total of perhaps 90,000 looms, makes monitoring of the industry extremely difficult if not 
impossible, it is claimed. Furthermore, the loose relationship between most exporters and 
loomowners makes control or even knowledge of conditions in their loomsheds 
impossible to know. From this premise has come the criticism that monitoring cannot, by 
definition, be successful and that the Rugmark program is, ergo, a "sham." The decision 
of SGS, alluded to earlier, not to undertake monitoring, "owing to the modus operandi of 
the industry," is cited as further evidence for this claim.    
2. Problems in the Participation and Role of NGOs. Only one "unregistered" NGO is 
represented on Rugmark's board, it has been claimed, and "none of the major Indian 
carpet exporters nor their trade association are represented in Rugmark." Alternatively, 
NGOs are criticized for allegedly playing too important or controlling a role in the 
training of inspectors, or in inspections themselves.    
3. Internal Rugmark Foundation Practices. There have been (unspecified) charges of 
corruption or nepotism involved in the Rugmark process, perhaps involving the improper 
use of Rugmark funds for SACCS activities, it is averred. A variant on this criticism is 
that there is a "greater need for transparency" of the Rugmark Foundation's operations 
and finances.    
4. Rugmark implies an inaccurate "Guarantee" of "No Child Labor." Since it is 
impossible to be 100 percent certain no child labor has been involved anywhere in the 
production of a carpet, it is asserted, a label which claims the carpet is made "without 
child labor" is by definition a false label. This criticism, primarily made by non-
participating carpet producers or importers, is related to a preference for a label which 
only says, as the Kaleen label reportedly will, "A portion of the proceeds of this sale is 
going to the rehabilitation of children."    
5. Rugmark lacks a rehabilitation program. While, according to this criticism, 
Rugmark may be an effective marketing scheme for Indian carpets to socially-conscious 
consumers, it has not in fact helped children find any alternative to employment in the 
loomsheds.    
Any of these criticisms, if true, reflect serious problems in the program. Our findings in 
relation to each of these were as follows:    
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1. Geographical limitations. This criticism was premised on the concept of universal 
monitoring of the entire industry from the beginning, in a semi-compulsory or 
compulsory program. However, the planners of Rugmark early on gave up this goal as 
unrealizable in the initial phase due to the diversity of the modes of production. Instead, a 
voluntary program was established, involving only the number of firms, loomsheds, and 
exporters who could be inspected and monitored by the Rugmark staff. Gradually the 
number of exporters has risen to 92 (as of June 30 1996), out of the 2,700 members of the 
CEPC, and the number of inspectors has reached 13. This is still a small program in 
India. However, by building it gradually on the basis of actual inspections and in line 
with growing capacity for monitoring, the Rugmark inspectorate have been able to 
maintain a high level of oversight of the program's actual participants and applicants. 
When questioned about their capacity to manage the number of looms in or seeking to be 
in the program, all the Rugmark officials interviewed expressed satisfaction with their 
current capacity and believed they could grow fast enough in personnel to absorb new 
licensees. It is planned to increase the inspectorate to 20 by the end of 1996.    
A statistical review of inspections supports this confidence. With approximately 13,000 
looms under inspection, either as licensee or applicant, Rugmark's 13 inspectors must 
each keep track of 1,000 looms. The director of the inspectorate indicates that each team 
of two inspectors visits 8 - 12 loomsites per day. With a five-day week, that totals 40-60 
loomsites per week, and between 2,000 and 3,000 looms per year. At present capacity, 
this allows for more than 5 visits to each loom each year!  
In addition, some of the exporters in the Rugmark program are providing their own 
checks on child labor. Ram International of Mirzapur, for example, has inspectors that 
check each one of its contractors' looms weekly for design, material quality, supplies and 
progress. These inspectors are now required to report names and ages of workers on each 
of their carpets.    
Finally, in most of the communities in the carpet belt, there are SACCS activists working 
with children in education or development projects. They provide another independent 
eye on the loomsheds and report the presence of child labor.    
This voluntary approach with overlapping oversight has rendered invalid the criticism 
that a large number of exporters couldn't participate because they had insufficient contact 
with their own carpets' production because they were working through brokers or buying 
finished carpets from independent loomowners. To be sure, such a voluntary program 
necessarily excludes these exporters. However, nothing in the program bars these 
entrepreneurs from shifting their mode of production in order to participate, should the 
benefits of being Rugmark licensee become apparent to them. In fact, it was the 
assumption of the founders of the Rugmark Foundation that its presence in the industry 
might itself help to generate a more responsible structure.viii 
2. The Role of NGOs. We found criticism of the role of NGOs on the board of Rugmark 
to be largely based on ignorance of the functioning of the board itself, or on rivalry 
among NGOs. It was assumed by some, including both industry representatives and non-
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participating NGOs, that the SACCS members were unduly involved in the selection and 
training of inspectors, or had undue control over finances. What we found was that while 
the SACCS representatives, both from BBA and CREDA, played a key role in the 
formative months of the new foundation, helping to locate candidates for various 
positions or briefing new staff members about the carpet industry based on their 15-year 
experience in liberating children from servitude at the looms and educating poor children 
in the carpet belt, SACCS representatives now are engaged only in the oversight and 
general policy making of the foundation. With a strong and capable staff in place, 
Executive Director Gen. Sondhi is now exclusively charged with this responsibility and 
hires and trains the staff inspectors. Board members are not required to have a hands-on 
involvement in day-to-day operations. Our experience with NGOs in the carpet belt 
related to SACCS indicated clearly that they don't have and don't want such a role. There 
appeared to be, in fact, very little contact at that level between the local SACCS affiliates 
and the Rugmark inspectorate. SACCS related groups, however, provide backup 
monitoring and are able to inform the Rugmark inspectors of the presence of children in 
loomshed that they encounter in the process of their social, educational or development 
work, or as a result of activity liberating children found in bondage.    
The complaint that SACCS representation was too narrow, and that a broader array of 
NGOs should be involved, was based on a lack of knowledge of the extent of the SACCS 
network, already mentioned above. However, steps are underway now to form an 
advisory group of academics and NGOs from outside the SACCS membership.    
3. Improper Rugmark practices. We had heard echoes of charges of nepotism, 
favoritism, corruption and mishandling of finances before leaving for the investigation. 
Efforts to get concrete details of these charges, however, had been unsuccessful. Once in 
India, we tried again to get specifics from those making such claims, and were again 
unsuccessful. However, we were able to trace each of the charges back to one of two 
individuals. Neither of them was available for a meeting during our visit. One of them, a 
politician with a background in the bonded labor liberation movement, later in an 
interview distanced himself from this type of charge and limited his criticism to point one 
above. The other, a member of the Rugmark board, turned out to have made critical 
comments to the press that he had not brought to the board itself. His motivation for 
making these charges remains unclear, but their provenance suggests an internal political 
motivation rather than one based on actual problems.    
Examining the financial statements of the Rugmark Foundation, which were, in fact 
transparently available to anyone wishing to see them, demonstrated to us that a careful 
accounting system is in place with rigid requirements for the disbursal of any funds. 
Parenthetically, on the frugal budget on which the Foundation is currently operating, 
there is clearly no margin for the wasting of funds on junkets or extraneous payoffs. The 
Board, which consists of highly prestigious Indian and international organizational 
representatives, will, we are confident, be vigilant in making certain that no room for 
extra-legal or unethical practices is allowed.    
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4. Improper Guarantee of "No Child Labor." This concern by non-participating 
exporters, plus some non-governmental groups, challenged whether Rugmark could 
"guarantee" its carpets to be free of child labor in light of the nature of the industry, and 
criticized the label for implying, if not stating such a guarantee. However, this criticism 
assumes that it is fair to expect Rugmark to make this ironclad guarantee, or to fail. No 
system of inspection or certification in the world can truthfully guarantee 100% success. 
The IRS, the SEC, and OSHA would all be lying if they claimed that their monitoring 
and enforcement mechanisms even approached that impossible standard. So, to accept as 
a criticism from importers and others that Rugmark can't guarantee 100% compliance is 
to impose a standard that ensures Rugmark (or any other system) will come up short.    
A balanced approach should discuss what a reasonable standard for compliance is and 
how adequate are countermeasures for non-compliance. Rugmark, as we experienced it, 
creates a high probability that violations will be discovered and penalties will be 
imposed. In fact, a significant number of violations have been found and violators 
excluded from the program. A serious if not large number of illegal child laborers have 
been found, and their masters censured and, in some cases, removed from the program. 
However, in the course of 18 months of operation in a climate in which the non-
participating exporters have demonstrated keen interest in showing Rugmark up to be a 
fraud, not a single case of fraudulently or falsely labeled carpets has been discovered. 
One of the unstated, but critically important informal elements of compliance monitoring 
is the mutual watching of each other by licensees, so that their competitors are not able to 
use the label without compliance. Even this informal, but effective, mechanism has failed 
to find a single instance of non-compliance.    
We concluded, therefore, that the implied "guarantee" of "no child labor" is well earned, 
inasmuch as a tight and effective system to prevent and punish non-compliance is in 
place, and, after the labeling of more than 260,000 carpets, no case of mis-labeling has 
been discovered, or even charged.    
5. Lack of Rehabilitation Programs. This was a matter of concern both to foes and 
friends of Rugmark. However, when we discussed the matter in detail with various 
persons related to the program, we understood why there had been a lag in developing 
these programs. Further, we discovered that plans were well underway to make up for 
lost time. Subsequently, we have learned, rehabilitation programs have been begun by 
Rugmark Foundation in Varanasi, and in Bihar state by both the state government and by 
SACCS affiliates. Since the question of what happens to the children is of such 
importance, the final section of this report will turn to this in detail.    
V. Rehabilitation, Prevention and Social Investment    
Given the large numbers of children "employed" in making carpets, it was assumed that 
Rugmark inspectors would find many children in the course of their rounds. The initial 
design called for a program of rehabilitation and education to accompany the inspections, 
so that children discovered could immediately be placed in a positive program. During 
the first 18 months of Rugmark's existence, that did not happen. About 700 children were 
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located, 80 percent of them local children. But for the others, who are considered bonded 
child laborers by the Rugmark inspectors, nothing systematic was done by Rugmark itself 
during the initial year except to report their names, etc. to the NGOs.    
Criticism from a number of sources, including the organizations in Europe that had 
supported the Rugmark initiative, began to mount. A number of proposals were made for 
corrective action, which are in the process of realization now.    
While the failure to address this problem adequately from the beginning is unfortunate, in 
retrospect, it is possible to understand why there was such a slow start. In the first place, 
the Rugmark inspectors went, by design, only to the loomshed of those exporters who 
were prepared to become licensees on the basis of not employing child labor. Therefore 
the incidence of children found at these loomsites was considerably less than the average 
in the industry, and the great majority of children found could simply be dismissed and 
sent home within the same village.    
Second, Rugmark inspectors were tasked with assessing facts, not raiding loomsheds or 
liberating children. Taking children out of the workplace by groups such as SACCS is, in 
fact, a process that requires considerable planning and coordination -- with parents, with 
police, and with agencies that can help the children make the transition. Rugmark 
inspectors, on the other hand, had neither the expertise nor the mandate, nor for that 
matter the legal right to uproot children from a workplace. This was a weakness in the 
initial design, inasmuch as the Rugmark Foundation did not have at first a contingency 
plan for handling found children, nor the facilities or staff to carry out rescues and 
rehabilitation.    
Third, as mentioned above, in order to prevent the misuse of information by rivals or 
detractors, Rugmark inspectors were mandated to provide information only to their 
headquarters in New Delhi, which then provided the data about children to SACCS and 
its member NGOs for their follow up. While this control of information flow was 
important to generating reliability and confidence in the program within the industry, it 
led to unfortunate delays and misses in handling the most needy children found.    
The fourth aspect of this initial program weakness was the slow acquisition of the funds 
to start rehabilitation. Rugmark had been designed so that rehabilitation programs were to 
be funded from the voluntary contributions of importers in Germany and other marketing 
countries. The German government had provided only the start-up funds for the 
inspectorate and management of the program. Thus, until importers sent contributions 
back to India, there were no earmarked monies available to set up rehab programs. This 
aspect of Rugmark, however, was delayed considerably in Germany, not India. German 
importers were hesitant to turn over these funds without a contract to establish the terms. 
For this, it was necessary to establish a Rugmark Foundation in Germany to coordinate 
the signing of contracts. Otherwise, the importers would not be able to claim these costs 
as business deductions. This legal system took months to develop, further postponing the 
flow of help.    
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However, since April 1996, the first funds from German importers have been collected, 
transmitted to UNICEF Germany, thence to UNICEF India, and been made available to 
Rugmark Foundation to establish facilities in Varanasi for rehabilitation and training of 
children found by the inspectors. Presumably the delays experienced in starting the flow 
will not persist.    
A school was established by Rugmark in July 1996 in Varanasi, and as this report goes to 
press, land is being purchased for an ashram, a residential rehabilitation and training 
center, in the carpet belt, to be run by the Rugmark Foundation as part of its rehabilitation 
program.    
After consideration, it was decided not to turn the rehabilitation funds over to the NGOs, 
lest this degenerate into Rugmark acting as a sort of "slush fund" for the NGOs on its 
board, rather than targeting the specific needs of children directly impacted by Rugmark's 
licensing scheme. Instead, it was determined that Rugmark could most effectively take up 
this aspect of its work through the formation of a second, independent operation in 
Varanasi, whose mandate and expertise would be focused on child rehabilitation. In this 
way the inspectors would be able to turn over information about children discovered in 
their rounds directly and immediately to their colleagues in the child care wing, avoiding 
both the delay of going through New Delhi and the uncertainty of providing sensitive 
information to groups outside the discipline of the Rugmark program. This second wing 
of the program is underway at last, with the school and the ashram as its primary 
oversight responsibility.    
What about the Others? However, the question of children released from the carpet 
looms is much larger than just the numbers found directly by Rugmark inspectors. There 
are reportedly hundreds of thousands of children making carpets, according to the most 
reliable estimate. What, we wanted to know, has been the impact of the Rugmark 
program on this greater population of carpet children?    
Perhaps the most encouraging aspect of all our findings was to learn that during the past 
year, thousands of children have begun an exodus from the carpet belt in such numbers 
that the Bihar government has been led to establish forty new schools in one of the four 
districts in that state most responsible for sending children to U.P. to work the looms. The 
publicity given to child labor, plus the pressure of the Rugmark program, have clearly 
had an impact. How large is impossible for us to estimate, but by all accounts from 
activists working in the region, it is significant.    
It is this fact that leads SACCS activists to argue that rehabilitation is essentially a 
government responsibility, rather than one that lies with either the Rugmark Foundation 
or child welfare NGOs. Their role, they insist, is in pressuring the government to enforce 
its laws and to carry out its responsibilities, and where useful, to assist local governments 
in carrying out rehab and educational projects. They also play a key role in educating 
parents in the "catchment areas" not to send their children off to work in the carpet 
industry.    
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In January 1996, SACCS organized a "Reha" committee of its organizers in U.P. and 
Bihar, to identify children in bondage from the catchment areas and free them with 
government help, to oversee and plan for rehabilitation of carpet children, to work with 
state and local governments to pressure for more effective and free education programs, 
to work with local communities prone to send children into the carpet industry, and to 
mobilize communities to discourage the recruitment or kidnaping of children. That 
committee's mid-year report illustrates the dramatic progress being made.    
Bihar Projects. SACCS groups have opened nine reporting centers in Bihar. These are 
located in Pulha, Saharsa, Araria, Garhwa, Jamua, Bhavnathpur, Nagar Uttari, Salkhua 
and Mahshi. Each of these centers has carried out "awareness camps" involving hundreds 
of villagers, marches, demonstrations, training programs, surveys and, in some cases, 
raids/rescue operations. These activities have had several discernible impacts. In Saharsa 
alone, "due to the continued pressure from SACCS (BBA) activists" the government has 
opened and provided funding for 50 schools for 2,000 former bonded carpet children. In 
each of these schools children receive Rs.100 (app. $3.00U.S) per month plus free 
stationery, books and other equipment. The BBA has been appointed as a member of the 
body to run these schools. "In all the 50 schools that SACCS(BBA) was actively involved 
in the process of the identification of freed children from carpet industry, to develop 
curriculum for the affected children admitted in the schools and the recruitment of the 
staff."ix 
Perhaps the most important aspect of these projects has been the educating of parents in 
isolated local villages about the dangers of sending their children to work in the carpet 
industry, as well as the need to pressurize their governments to provide adequate schools. 
Most of these parents are scheduled caste members, illiterate, and have never been 
outside their own village area. In the past they have been easily persuaded by 
middlemen/recruiters for the carpet makers that in return for a loan they could send their 
children away where they would get an education and training in a craft. This cruel 
deception is at the heart of the tragedy of bonded child labor in making carpets. With 
education, and in particular, with the activism of former bonded child laborers who have 
returned home to talk of their experiences, villagers in the areas of SACCS activities have 
become much more cautious about parting with their children and active in demanding 
government educational services at home.    
As a result of all these activities, a team of senior Bihar state officials visited the UP 
carpet belt to learn first hand the plight of children, mostly from Bihar, working at the 
carpet looms. Further, according to SACCS, "The pressure built by activists ... in the area 
has frightened agents of loom owners and carpet manufacturers / exporters so much that 
the incidents of kidnap and employment of children in carpet belt is on the decline." 
SACCS evaluates the attitude of government officials in Bihar as "quite encouraging."    
Uttar Pradesh Projects. SACCS-BBA has set up local offices in Mirzapur, Bhadohi, 
and Varanasi, upgrading their activities and staff, and has opened a new office in 
Ghazipur, an area into which the carpet industry appears to be spreading. As in Bihar, the 
activities of these centers include awareness camps, demonstrations, training programs, 
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and raid/rescue operations. These activities have strengthened local awareness, 
encouraged local officials to take action and tightened the network of information about 
particularly egregious situations so that SACCS activists can bring them to the attention 
of police and rescue the children.    
The Varanasi office coordinates activities for a large number of NGOs related to SACCS 
throughout the carpet belt, including Mirzapur, Sondbhadra, Bhadohi, Allahabad, 
Garhwal, Nagaruttarum, Ghazipur, Robertsganj, Palamau, Saharsa, Khagaria and 
Madhubabni and elsewhere.  
These pressures have been partially responsible for state officials taking up the issue of 
bonded child labor. The District Collectors of Mirzapur, Varanasi, Bhadohi and Ghazipur 
have each ordered surveys of children engaged at carpet looms. The Labor Commissioner 
of Varanasi, in fact, during a meeting we attended on May 1, announced that he had just 
been authorized to open 20 schools in the district for carpet children, and that the district 
would develop a "large scale" project to encourage "women and children artisans."    
According to SACCS' report, due to these activities the Mirzapur administration has also 
taken several steps to eliminate child servitude, including improving teaching methods in 
local schools, providing funds for repairs, getting financial assistance to families of 
bonded children to improve their economic conditions, increased pressure on employers 
to pay the minimum statutory wages, and set up new schools. In Mirzapur, "the 
government of India has sanctioned 50 schools of which 10 are set up under IPEC project 
and 40 under the NCLP (National Child Labor Project)"x, a program of the Prime 
Minister.    
Also because of these increased pressures, SACCS activists elsewhere in UP note the 
extension into more remote areas of carpet production. In June, activists from Bandha 
informed SACCS that "rattled by the raids and rescue operations initiated by SACCS - 
BBA activists, the carpet manufacturers are opening units in Bandha district on a large 
scale migrating from Mirzapur - Bhadohi belts. They found this area safer and children 
are available for work in plenty."xi They had identified some 250 looms in 28 villages of 
the district, and were working in those villages to prevent abuses.    
SACCS also notes that, because of the expansion of carpet manufacturing in neighboring 
Rajasthan state, they have also opened a reporting center in Alwar and are beginning to 
plan rehabilitation activities there.    
These developments illustrate the importance of a strong program, not just of 
rehabilitation but of prevention and public awareness throughout the region. SACCS, 
with its 123 allied groups in UP and Bihar, is well situated to expand as needed if this 
trend continues.    
In brief, we found that while specific rehabilitation programs had been delayed as a 
component of Rugmark's own work, the SACCS network has strengthened its already 
existing work in the carpet belt and the catchment areas sufficiently to meet the 
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challenges of the new situation. We were most encouraged to learn the extent of this 
work, and increasingly, to see the fruits of it in changed attitudes and opportunities for 
villagers and their children in this poverty-stricken corner of India. Resources made 
available to this work through the Rugmark importer contributions will strengthen it 
immensely.    
VI. Conclusions and Recommendations    
1. The gradual, voluntary approach of Rugmark is successful in generating compliance 
from a growing number of licensees. Now, more than 15% of all registered carpet looms 
in India are under Rugmark licensees or applicants.    
2. The inspection system is effective. No falsely labeled carpets have been discovered to 
date. The reputation of Rugmark's inspectors in the carpet belt as being "incorruptible" 
appears to be well earned.    
3. The NGO community remains divided, but the charges of SACCS representing too 
small a sampling of NGOs seems unwarranted. There is, however, some need for 
expanding NGO ownership of the program.    
4. Rugmark's rehabilitation programs were slow in starting, but by mid-1996, when 
considered within the context of ongoing and expanding SACCS-related programs, the 
scope and effectiveness of this effort was commendable.    
5. Charges of corruption, nepotism, or financial mismanagement turned out to be without 
any basis.    
6. Pressure on government and industry has been effective, especially in Bihar. Even in 
U.P., government promises have been made to commit funds to rehabilitation and 
education.    
7. Most promising is the recent exodus out of U.P. back to Bihar of former bonded child 
carpet weavers. While the overall scope of this exodus has not yet been measured, all we 
spoke with commented on its significance. One carpet exporter even indicated that as far 
as he could ascertain, child labor was already "down by 80%."    
8. However, the push by some carpet makers into new areas of Rajasthan and U.P. is 
worrisome. This will require redoubling of efforts in the marketing countries to make 
non-labeled carpets commercially non-viable, as well as heightened vigilance on the part 
of Indian NGOs.    
9. The success of the Rugmark initiative now depends as much on market actions in the 
U.S. and the extension to other producer countries as it does on actions in India and 
Nepal.  
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Appendix  
South Asian Coalition on Child Servitude  
Associates in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar States  
June 1996 
Organization Name Place State    
1. Yuva Vikas Sansthan Ghazipur U.P.  
2. Service for Help and Rural Education Mussorie U.P.  
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3. Shri Bhuvaneshvari Mahila Ashram Tehri Garwal U.P.  
4. Khidmadgar Samiti Gole Market U.P.  
5. Kosi Lok Manch Saharsa Batraha Bihar  
6. People's Science Institute Dehradoon U.P.  
7. Parivartan Bastar U.P.  
8. People's Action for National Integration Faizabad U.P.  
9. Yuva Kalyan Samiti Fatehpur U.P.  
10. Vikas Bharati Unnav U.P.  
11. Badlao Foundation Dumka Bihar  
12. Inst. Of Social Health Welfare Rural Dev. & Edu. Socy Faizabad U.P.  
13. Mithila Samajik Evam Arthik Vikas Sansthan Laheriasarai Bihar  
14. Yuva Vikas Evam Prasikshan Sansthan Banda U.P.  
15. Diocese of Bijnor Panen Dist. U.P.  
16. Nalanda Sewa Sansthan Nalanda Bihar  
17. Tagore Bal Niketan Evam Balwadi Kendra Mirzapur U.P.  
18. Aligarh for Life and Harmony Aligarh U.P.  
19. Jharkhandis Organisation for Human Rights Singhbhum West Bihar  
20. Manish Gramodhyog Sewa Sanstahn Faizabad U.P.  
21. Poorvanchal Sewa Sansthan Deoria U.P.  
22. Servants of India Society Sonebhadra U.P.  
23. Day Centre for Elderly International Dehradoon U.P.  
24 . Himalayan Inland Mission Massorie U.P.  
25. Jan Sikshan Kendra Jamui Bihar  
26. Lok Jagruti Kendra Deogarh Bihar  
27. Awadh Vikas Sewa Mandal Faizabad U.P.  
28. Gram Vikas Sewa Sansthan Sultanpur U.P.  
29. Shoratgarh Environmental Society Sidhartnagar U.P.  
30. Prayaas Jhansi U.P.  
31. Jaanprayas Mao U.P.  
32. B. R. D. Kushta Sevashram Nainital U.P.  
33. Jan Jagran Kendra Hazaribagh Bihar  
34. Jan Sewa Sansthan Almora U.P.  
35. Purvanchal Pravate Samiti Ghazipur U.P.  
36. Jan Jati Vikas Samiti Sonebhadra U.P.  
37. Uthkarsh Sanstan Tatha Karyasamuha Kisn Sang Banda U.P.  
38. Gramonnati Sanstan Mahoba U.P.  
39. Nagrik Bharti Prathisthan Azamgarh U.P.  
40. Institute for Extention of Rural Technology Allahabad U.P.  
41. Lok Prerna B. Deoghar Bihar  
42. Gomati Prayog Jan Kalyan Parishad Chamoli U.P.  
43. Samagra Gram Vikas Samiti Azamgarh U.P.  
44. Maharishi Dayanand Bal Vidhyalaya Varanasi U.P.  
45. Dr. Bhimarad Ambedkar Shiksha Sansthan Deoria U.P.  
46. Shama Vikas Samiti Nalanda Bihar  
47. Kosi Punervash Vikas Parishad Saharsa Bihar  
48. Manav Samadhan Evam Mahila Vikas Sansthan Varanasi Bihar  
49. Social Welfare Institute Varanasi U.P.  
50. Mahila Ekta Samiti Varanasi U.P.  
51. Fanishwarnath Research and Training Centre Bokaro Bihar  
52. Akhil Bharatiya Yuva Kalyan Swapa Knished Parishad Varanasi U.P.  
53. Swani Vivekanand Shiksha Samiti Mirzapur U.P.  
54. A. C. C. Society Varanasi U.P.  
55. Vishwa Nari Kalyan Parishad Varanasi U.P.  
56 . Akhil Bharatiya Sadbhavna Sanghatan Varanasi U.P.  
57 . Dastkar Hat Samiti Varanasi U.P.  
58. Samagra Vikas Khadi Gramodyog Sansthan Varanasi U.P.  
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59. Shanti Samiti Varanasi U.P.  
60. Gudiya Varanasi U.P.  
61. Manv Sewa Kendra Varanasi U.P.  
62. Resham Khadi Gramodyog Vikas Sansthan Varanasi U.P.  
63. Dr. Shambhunath Research Foudation Varanasi U.P.  
64. Yuva Gram Vikas Samiti Varanasi U.P.  
65. Ashok Mission Educational Society Varanasi U.P.  
66. Sukshupa Samiti Varanasi U.P.  
67. Akhil Bharatiya Kalyan Swapak Nished Parishad Varanasi U.P.  
68. Vanvasi Shramjivi Sewashram Varanasi U.P.  
69. Panchnad Varanasi U.P.  
70. Varanasi Taikvando Society Varanasi U.P.  
71. Maharishi Daayanand Shikshan Sansthan Varanasi U.P.  
72. Ramshandra Shukla Sahitya Shodh Sansthan Varanasi U.P.  
73. ABC Akademi Varanasi U.P.  
74. Navbharat Sanskritik Va Samajik Sewa Sansthan Varanasi U.P.  
75. Jhunjhunwala Charity Trust Varanasi U.P.  
76. Human Rights Foundation of India Varanasi U.P.  
77. Samajik Nyay Morcha Varanasi U.P.  
78. Association for People Varanasi U.P.  
79. Pravasi Nepali Sangh Varanasi U.P.  
80. Damudayik Seva Kendra Varanasi U.P.  
81. Nawal Educational And Research Institute Ballia U.P.  
82. Yuvak Vikas Samiti Bhadhohi U.P.  
83. Bharatiya Vrisha Laghu Udyog Balvikas & Mahila Samit Mirzapur U.P.  
84. Chuharmal Seva Sansthan Saharsa Bihar  
85. Kosi Consortium Saharsa Bihar  
86. Lok Bharti Seva Ashram Supaul Bihar  
87. Satlok Seva Ashram Madhubani Bihar  
88. Gharib Ghar Saharsa Bihar  
89. Sabri Seva Ashram Saharsa Bihar  
90. Lalit Kosi Seva Ashram Kakadia Bihar  
91. Sonbharsa Prakhand Swaraj Sabha Saharsa Bihar  
92. Bachpan Vikas Kendra Madhipura Bihar  
93. Seva Niketan Samastipur Bihar  
94. Glasswork Mazdoor Sangh Aligarh U.P.  
95. Dalit Sena Aligarh U.P.  
96. Ankur Foudation Allahabad U.P.  
97. Musibat Baranpur U.P.  
98. Badausa Khetriya Vikas Samiti Badausa U.P.  
99. Utkarsh Sansthan Banda U.P.  
100. Sameeksha Ghaziabad U.P.  
101. Unyo Vill. Murtajabad U.P.  
102. V.V.S.S. Mauranipur U.P.  
103. U.P. Voluntary Association Network Lucknow U.P.  
104. Creda Mirzapur U.P.  
105. Child Labor Welfare Society Mohgalpura U.P.  
106. Uttaranchal Vikas Sansthan Banvasa U.P.  
107. Nikhil Bharat Banwasi Panchayat Sonebhadra U.P.  
108. Samta Mahila Vikas Sansthan Sonebhadra U.P.  
109. Nav. Yuvak Mangal Dal Varanasi U.P.  
110. Manavi Patna Bihar  
111. Sakhi Kendra Kanpur U.P.  
112. Bharatiya Vrisha Lagu Udyog Balvikas Samiti & Mahila Samiti Mirzapur U.P.  
113. Mahila Arthik Sanskritik Evam Shikshak Vikkas Sanghatan Varanasi U.P.  
114. Bharatiya Lok Tantrik Kranti Dal Babura Bihar  
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115. Upvha Lucknow U.P.  
116. Manav Vikas Prakala Parbhani Dist. Bihar  
117. Sri Ram Mohan Sewa Ashram Chandausi Bihar  
118. Hindkhet Mazdoor Panchayat Supoul Bihar  
119. Prakrutikyog Kusht Arogyadam Saharsa Bihar  
120. Sahitya Kala Manch Khagaria Dist. Bihar  
121. Arpan Gramin Vikas Samiti Patna Bihar  
122. Gram Vikas Samiti Faridabad U.P.  
123. Nav Bharat Jagruti Kendra Hazaribagh Dist. Bihar   
                                                 
i Cf Harvey & Riggin, Trading Away the Future: Child Labor in India's Export Industries, International 
Labor Rights Education and Research Fund, 1994, p. 72. A detailed sample survey of the industry in 1993 
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Without Child Labor", adopted May 27, 1993. 
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Industry," 4 July, 1994, p. 5. 
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vi Testimony of Dan Hodges, U.S. Dept. Of Labor hearing on child labor, June 29, 1995(*check date), p. 2. 
vii Letter from V. R. Sharma to Dietrich Kebschull, IGEP, Feb. 28, 1994. 
viii As an example and by contrast, the exposure of similar problems in Pakistan's soccer ball industry, 
where thousands of stitching sheds are employing child labor in villages within a 50 mile radius of the city 
of Sialkot as subcontractors for manufacturers, is leading to changes in the way soccer balls are made. A 
need to gain control of the conditions of production has caused several major retailers of soccer balls in the 
U.S., including Reebok and Nike, to bring all their production in to factories being built in the city of 
Sialkot, where conditions can be monitored more successfully. 
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x SACCS, "Progress Report of the REHA action plan SACCS regional (carpet region) campaign along with 
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